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Cuba, U.S. Naval Blockade of
Start Date: April 22, 1898
End Date: August 14, 1898

As early as March 23, 1898, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long produced a
plan to close the ports along the western half of Cuba’s northern coast. On April
18, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, commander of the North Atlantic Squadron,
issued a memorandum concerning ship dispositions for such a blockade. In early
1898, the U.S. Navy possessed 96 ships of varying qualities and capabilities.
However, the navy’s ability to enforce a blockade of Cuba was augmented
substantially by a $50 million emergency congressional appropriations bill passed
on March 9. That bill authorized the purchasing or leasing of additional ships
from private sources and other government agencies, including the U.S. Revenue
Cutter Service.
Sampson’s squadron began the process of implementing the blockade on April
22 when his ships sailed from Key Est, Florida for Cuba. Although the blockade
officially commenced on the morning of April 23, it took time to fully implement
because of delays in providing adequate numbers of ships as well as the requisite
logistical support for the fleet, such as coal, food, and fresh water. Sampson was
hard-pressed to cover 2,000 miles of Cuban shoreline with just 26 ships. The

shortage of ships prevented him from maintaining a continuous blockade of it
until June 28. By late June, Sampson was able to close off the southern ports as
well, preventing the Spanish from obtaining supplies from Mexico and Central
America. Eventually his squadron grew to 124 ships. Still, his naval assets were
spread perilously thin given the long shorelines and distances involved, and
occasionally ships were absent on other duties. Additional ships were continually
added to enforce the blockade, the most famous of these being the battleship
Oregon, which steamed from its Bremerton, Washington, home port around
South America to reach Key West.
The blockade was carried out according to international law, with ships having
left Spain prior to the war being declared immune from search. Spanish vessels
that were docked in U.S. ports when the war was declared were given until May
21 to leave and were permitted to take on enough coal to reach their home port.
However, inconsistencies in blockade enforcement did occur. On August 8, 1898,
a Navy Department official reported that three neutral nations were filing
complaints with the U.S. State Department about their vessels being seized and
expressing concern about potentially costly damage claims that ship owners could
file against the United States.

The blockaders intercepted ships in transit to Cuba, seized contraband goods
consistent with maritime law provisions, and engaged in several battles with
Spanish ships. The first of these clashes occurred on April 27 when U.S. ships
were fired upon and responded by shelling Punta Gorda at Matanzas to prevent
construction of Spanish artillery batteries there.
Further combat actions occurred on May 11 when U.S. warships cut the cable
to Madrid at Cienfuegos. Later that same day hidden Spanish batteries at
Cárdenas attacked several U.S. ships including the torpedo boat Winslow, which
was seriously damaged.
Another U.S. squadron, commanded by Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, was
ordered to leave Charleston, South Carolina, for Key West to prepare to intercept
a Spanish squadron under Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, believed to be
headed to Cuba from the Cape Verde Islands. Schley’s squadron arrived off
Santiago on May 26. These reinforcements enabled a southern front to be added
to the U.S. naval blockade. In the Meantime, however, Cervera’s ships had
managed to make it to Santiago de Cuba unhindered. Sampson then
administered a tight blockade of Santiago. On the morning of July 3, 1898,

Spanish forces attempted to break out of a harbor there, producing a running
battle in which all the Spanish ships were either sunk or scuttled.
Assorted other engagements between U.S. and Spanish forces occurred at
various locations in Cuba, including west of the Isle of Pines, Barracoa, and
Manzillo, which resulted in Spanish ships being destroyed or captured along with
some modest U.S. uses. The war ended with a cease-fire agreement on August
12, 1898, although American naval assets remained in the area for a considerable
time thereafter. The naval blockade was officially lifted on August 14.
Despite some inconsistency in execution and enforcement, the blockade was
relatively successful in cutting off Spanish forces from supplies and
reinforcements. A number of blockade runners did make it through the blockade,
the most famous of these being the Montserrat. Many others were either
destroyed or captured, however. Significant credit for the blockade’s military
successes stems from effective planning and training exercises conducted by the
U.S. Naval War College and Office of Naval Intelligence in the years before the war
and to legislation in 1890 and 1892 authorizing new naval construction. The
blockade did cause some hardship for the Cuban civilian population in the way of

food shortages and clothing, and a scarcity of kerosene, but its relatively short
duration prevented these shortages from becoming more severe.
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